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Flaxman: The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guidelines

THE HIDDEN DANGERS
OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Kenneth N. Flaxman*
Sentencing guidelines are the keystone of several contemporary proposals to eliminate the "national scandal' of unwarranted
sentence disparity. 2 The premise of guidelines theory is that it is
not only possible but desirable to create a table which indicates the
"customary sentence" for any combination of offense and offender
characteristics. 3 The judicial sentencing decision is simply whether
to depart from the guidelines; any such departure is then subject
to appellate review.4
Sentencing guidelines have been voluntarily adopted by courts
in several jurisdictions, 5 and are included in S. 1437,6 the revision
* B.E.E., 1968, City University of New York; J.D., 1972, IIT-Chicago-Kent
College of Law. The author is the principal attorney for the putative plaintiff class in
Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572).
1. 124 CONG. REC. S13 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). See
also Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1
(1978).
2.

See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CIMINAL SENTENCES 118-23 (1973); D. GOTT-

FREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING
119-27 (1978); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 26-27 (1977).

3. See, e.g., P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 73.
4. Id.
5. Sentencing guidelines have been used in Denver County, Colorado; Essex
County, New Jersey; and Cook County, Illinois. See Kress, Wilkins & Gottfredson, Is
the End of Judicial Sentencing in Sight?, 60 JuD. 216, 220-22 (1976). Guidelines
have also been used by one state court judge in El Paso, Texas. See Alschuler,
Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
"Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 561 n.37 (1978).
Some district judges apparently use the federal parole guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20
(1978), as sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120,
1130 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2261 (1978).
Cf. Banks v. United States, 553 F.2d 37, 39 (8th Cir. 1977) (dicta that district judges
should impose sentence to conform to federal parole guidelines).
6. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 124 (1978) (to be codified, if enacted, in 28
U.S.C. § 994(c)). This Article deals with §§ 101 and 124 of the bill. Id. §§ 101, 124.
Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18 of the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the
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of the Federal Criminal Code passed by the Senate in the NinetyFifth Congress. 7 None of these schemes provides an a priori definition of what the customary sentence should be for various combinations of offense and offender characteristics. On the contrary, they
rely on statistical analyses of preguideline sentencing practices to
show what has been the customary sentence for various combinations of offense and offender characteristics. This approach creates
what are called descriptive guidelines. Such guidelines are intended to make explicit that which has previously been implicit
and thereby insure that the same criteria are applied in future
decisionmaking. 8
Some proponents of descriptive guidelines cite the federal
parole guidelines9 as demonstrating the feasibility of such an approach. 10 While experience with the parole guidelines shows that
guidelines can effectively regulate the exercise of discretion," the
12
parole guidelines have, until recently, escaped serious scrutiny.
It is the theme of this Article that experience With the federal
parole guidelines fails to establish the feasibility of descriptive
guidelines to insure that judicial sentencing decisions are made
fairly. While the federal parole guidelines have been effective in
bringing overall uniformity to decisionmaking, individual parole decisions are made with equal or greater arbitrariness than was formerly the case. In addition, analysis of the creation of the federal
parole guidelines demonstrates how the descriptive approach reUnited States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18 U.S.C. Section 124 of
the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States Code to establish a
Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 124 of
the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 28 of the United States Code,
and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
7. S. 1437 was approved by the Senate on January 30, 1978, 124 CONG. REC.
S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978), but did not emerge from the House Judiciary
Committee during the 95th Congress.
8. D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WhiluNs & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 137.
9. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). See text accompanying notes 33-58 infra.
10. See, e.g., D. GOTTFBEDSON, L. WILIaNS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at
123; P. ODONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 21-28.
11. Approximately eighty percent of all decisions conform to the parole guidelines. See B. Stone-Meierhoefer, Workload and Decision Trends: Statistical Highlights 10/74-9/77, at R-10 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 18, 1977).
12. The guidelines have been upheld in numerous district court decisions in
habeas corpus cases brought by prisoners who have been denied parole. See, e.g.,
Wiley v. United States Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Battle v.
Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1973). The first appellate court decision to seriously question the validity of the guidelines came five years after the guidelines
were adopted. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572).
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sults in the delegation of policymaking from those entrusted with
that duty to those who claim to be value-free social scientists. 3
After a brief discussion of the use of guidelines to regulate the
exercise of discretion, a careful analysis of the genesis and application of the parole guidelines is undertaken to show how overall
uniformity in decisionmaking has been achieved at the cost of
equal or greater arbitrariness in individual decisions. This high cost
is especially important in light of the complex set of sentencing
guidelines contemplated in the Senate bill.' 4 The conclusion
reached is that unless great caution is used in creating sentencing
guidelines, the result will be the same: overall uniformity at the
expense of individual fairness.
STRUCTURING SENTENCING DISCRETION
THROUGH GUIDELINES

At the present time, a federal district judge has the power to
"determine conclusively, decisively and finally the minimum period of time a defendant must remain in prison, without being subject to any review of his determination."' 5 Congress has yet to pro6
vide any guidance about how this discretion should be exercised.'
One result is that "sentencing in the Federal criminal justice system is marked by uncontrolled and unwarranted disparity among
7
judges."'
Various proposals have been advanced to control the problem
of unwarranted sentence disparity. One idea, rooted in the concept
of indeterminate sentencing, would vest all sentencing decisions in
a centralized tribunal, which would make decisions on a "scientific
13.

See text accompanying notes 62-72 infra.

14. See text accompanying notes 23-32 infra.
15. Symposium-Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 257, 260-61 (1962)
(remarks of Kaufman, J.).
16. The only limitation on how discretion should be exercised is the requirement that a decision not to commit a youth offender under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976), be accompanied by a finding that treatment
would be of no benefit to the youth. Id. § 5010. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418
U.S. 424 (1974).
17. S.REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 883 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. This finding of unwarranted sentence disparity is based on statistics
which show, for example, that bank robbery sentences vary from an average of 30.7
months in the Southern District of New York to 176.4 months in the Southern District of Alabama. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S.1437 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9227 (1977) (paper prepared by Karen Skrivseth, Office
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings].
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basis."' 8 The difficulty in this approach, however, is the lack of a
reliable basis for precisely determining when a prisoner has been
rehabilitated.' 9 Another proposal is to redefine offenses to eliminate judicial discretion in fixing punishment.20 Such a system of
"fixed price sentencing" has been criticized because it would
merely move the problem of unstructured discretion from judges
to prosecutors, 2 ' and because it might require that penalties be minutely defined to maintain distinctions between offenses. 22
The guideline approach to controlling sentencing discretion in
S. 143723 combines these two proposals. A centralized Sentencing
Commission 24 would promulgate sentencing guidelines based on
objective measures of the total circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender's background. 25 These guidelines would set
18. 4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
48-49 (1939).
19. A task force of the American Psychological Association recently concluded:
It does appear from reading the research that the validity of psychological
predictions of violent behavior, at least in the sentencing and release situations we are considering, is extremely poor, so poor that one could oppose
their use on the strictly empirical grounds that psychologists are not professionally competent to make such judgements.
Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, Report, 33
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978).
20. See, e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE
98-106 (1976).
21. The argument is that fixed-price sentencing would make the length of sentence dependent on two factors that are within the unreviewable discretion of
the prosecutor-the offense to be charged, and whether a guilty plea should be accepted to a lesser included offense. See F. Zimring, Making the Punishmment Fit the
Crime 13-14 (1977) (occasional papers from University of Chicago Law School). In an
attempt to meet this problem if sentencing guidelines are adopted, the Department
of Justice has announced its intention to promulgate detailed guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during charging and plea bargaining stages of a criminal case. See Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 9221 n.167 (paper prepared by
Karen Skrivseth, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
22. F. Zimring, supra note 21, at 13; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 560-61;
O'Leary, Gottfredson & Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals, 11 CRIM. L.
BULL. 555, 580 (1975).
23. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 994(b)-(d), (f)-(m).
24. Id. § 991. The Sentencing Commission was fashioned after the concept put
forward by District Judge Marvin Frankel. See Kennedy, Foreword to P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGiN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at ix.
25. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 994 (c)-(d). "[Slound statistical studies
on the effectiveness of certain sanctions or treatment programs" can be used in the
creation of guidelines. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1169. The "principal determinants" of the guidelines, however, are to be "the prior records of offenders and
the criminal conduct for which they are to be sentenced." Id. at 1161.
PROCEDURES
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out the average punishment for any combination of offender and offense characteristics. 26 The trial judge would retain discretion in
fixing sentence,2 7 but any decision to impose a punishment different from that set by the guidelines in effect at the time of
review on appeal either by the
sentencing 2s would be subject to
2 9
government.
the
by
or
defendant
The guidelines contemplated in the Senate bill are highly
complex. First, the appropriate form of punishment (probation,
fine, or imprisonment) must be identified. Then an appropriate
penalty must be determined (amount of fine, or duration of term of
probation or imprisonment). 30 Guidelines as complex as these are
unprecedented. One witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee predicted that the entire Sentencing Commission would be
"a nice exercise . . . in futility." 3 1 At the very least, creation of
32
sentencing guidelines will be "a complex [and] difficult task."

26. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 994(b). This requirement is explained
in the Senate Report: "The Committee expects the Commission to issue guidelines
sufficiently detailed and refined to reflect every important factor relevant to
sentencing for each category of offense and each category of offender, give appropriate weight to each factor, and deal with various combinations of factors." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 17, at 1167.
27. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 2003.
28. Id. § 2003(a)(2). The Senate Report relies on Ruip v. United States, 555
F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977), and an unreported decision, Kreis v. Seigler, No. 75-1543
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1976), to support the view that use of the guidelines in effect at
the time of sentencing would not contravene the constitutional prohibition of ex post
facto laws, U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, para. 3. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 892
n.31. The contrary view is expressed in Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n,
579 F.2d 238, 263-67 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572).
29. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 3725(a)-(b). Given the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, whether the government can
appeal to increase a defendant's sentence is, at best, unclear. Compare Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) and Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905)
and Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) with United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975). See Note, Twice in Jeopardy: ProsecutorialAppeals of Sentences, 63
VA. L. REv. 325 (1977).
30. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 6, § 994(a)(1).
Guidance for the judge in determining whether to sentence a convicted defendant to a sentence of probation, to pay a fine, or to a term of imprisonment... may prove to be one of the most important parts of the guidelines
process, since current law provides no guidance or mechanism for guidance
to judges on this crucial decision, leading to considerable unwarranted disparity which there is no mechanism to correct
SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1163 (footnote omitted).
31. Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 9141, 9143 (statement of John J. Cleary
on behalf of the National Legal Aid & Defender Association).
32. Id. at 8930, 8934 (statement of Dean Don M. Gottfredson, School of Crimi-
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Some of the problems which must be solved if fair sentencing
guidelines are to be developed have been encountered under the
parole guidelines examined below.
FEDERAL PAROLE GUIDELINES

From the creation of federal parole in 1910

3

until the adop-

1973, a 4 the

tion of the parole guidelines in
Parole Board made virtually no attempt to articulate35 the policies it was implementing in
discharging its broad statutory discretion: The Board was authorized to grant parole if there was a "reasonable probability" that a
prisoner could "live and remain at liberty without violating the
laws, and if in the opinion of the board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society."3 6 By 1973, the failure of the
nal Justice, Rutgers University). The Senate Judiciary Committee agreed, concluding
that sentencing guidelines will indeed be difficult to develop. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1166-67.
33. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819.
34. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973). See note 40 infra.
35. The Board did make some attempt to explain why persons convicted of
some drug offenses and some persons convicted of violations of Selective Service
laws were being paroled at a higher than average rate. See UNITED STATES BOARD
OF PAROLE, BIENNIAL REPORT 1970-1972, at 24 (1973). In this report, the higher

parole rate for persons convicted of drug offenses was explained as resulting from
"the recognized need for intensive control in the community after release," id. at 24,
and from leniency for marijuana offenders. Id. at 24. The higher than average parole
rate for selective service offenders was explained as resulting from a desire to minimize "the wide disparity in sentencing practices by the courts." Id. at 24.
36. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819. Parole release criteria were
essentially unchanged from 1910 to 1976, when the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 was enacted. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (codified in 18
U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976)). Compare the language of the original parole statute
with the parole provisions of the 1970 edition of the United States Code:
[If it shall appear to said board of parole from a report by the proper officers of such prison or upon application by a prisoner for release on parole,
that there is a reasonable probability that such applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the
board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, then said
board of parole may in its discretion authorize the release of such applicant
on parole.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819 (emphasis added).
If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release on
parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and
remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the
Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the
Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 854 (formerly codified in 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)
(1970)) (amended 1976) (emphasis added). The 1976 parole statute requires that a pris-
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Parole Board to articulate its policies had become the subject of
increasing criticism, 37 culminating in Childs v. United States Board
of Parole,38 a district court decision directing the Parole Board to
enunciate release policies. 39
The parole guidelines were adopted in 197340 to comply with
the Childs decision, 41 and, with minor variations,4 have been used
continuously thereafter. 43 In general, a severity rating of the prospective parolee's offense is used in the guidelines to determine
the minimum customary range of imprisonment 44 which must ordioner shall be released on parole, pursuant to guidelines, if "release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; and... would
not jeopardize the public welfare." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976).
37. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARtY JUSTICE 126 (1969); ABA Administrative Law Section, Administrative Conference Recommendation 72-3: Procedures of
the United States Board of Parole, 25 An. L. REv. 531 (1973).
38. 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 1247-48.
40. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973). The guidelines had previously been used in a
pilot project at five institutions. See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 926 (D.
Conn. 1973).
41. The Parole Board acquiesced in that portion of the district court's decision
directing it to convey to prisoners a reasonably comprehensive explanation of criteria
used to judge parole applications. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d
1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming other portions of district court's decision).
42. Variations have been made in the "offense severity scale," discussed infra
at notes 44-48, and in the factors involved in the "salient factor scale," discussed infra at notes 49-53. See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,045 (1977) (change in salient factor scale); 42
Fed. Reg. 31,786 (1977) (change in severity levels of several offenses); 42 Fed. Reg.
52,399 (subclassing "greatest" severity rating into "Greatest I" and "Greatest II").
43. Following Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1974), which held that promulgation of the guidelines was governed by publication
and notice standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1970), the guidelines were repromulgated on an emergency basis, 39 Fed. Reg.
45,223, 45,296 (1974), and were reissued on September 5, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328
(1975). After May 16, 1976, the effective date of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976), the Parole Commission
repromulgated the guidelines on an emergency basis. 41 Fed. Reg. 19,330-31, 19,341
(1976). Subsequent revisions appear at 41 Fed. Reg. 37,322 (1976), 42 Fed. Reg.
12,045 (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 31,786 (1977), and 42 Fed. Reg. 52,398 (1977). For the
most recent revisions, see 44 Fed. Reg. 26,540-52 (1979).
44. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The "customary range of imprisonment" is said
to have been derived from the median length of imprisonment served for each
"severity/prognosis" level, to which was added an arbitrary "discretion range." See
P. Hoffman & D. Gottfredson, Paroling Policy Guidelines: A Matter of Equity 10
(NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp. Rep. No. 8, 1973). An independent
researcher, however, has determined from an analysis of preguideline parole decisions that "it would be difficult to conclude that the ranges of time indicated on the
guidelines were based on the past practice and policy of the board." J. SCHMIDT,
DEMYSTIFYING PAROLE 52 (1977).
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narily be served before parole will be granted. 45 The minimum
customary range of imprisonment is independent of the maximum
sentence which could have been imposed. 46 It is, instead, deter-

mined in accordance with a unique classification of offenses into
seven severity levels. 47 The severity of a prisoner's offense is classified on the basis of the offense originally charged, rather than on
any lesser included offense for which a plea bargain might have
48
been negotiated.
A prisoner's "salient factor score" determines whether and by
how much the minimum customary length of imprisonment is to
be increased. 49 The salient factor scale consists of seven factors
which have been correlated to the likelihood of recidivism following release from prison. 50 A prisoner's salient factor score can
be any number between zero and eleven. 5 ' Scores of nine through
45. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). In fiscal year 1975, 91.3% of all prisoners were required to serve at least their "customary length of imprisonment" before being paroled. In fiscal year 1976 the percentage increased slightly to 93% and in fiscal year
1977 was virtually unchanged at 93.4%. B. Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note 11, at
R-10. (These figures are developed by combining, for each year indicated, the annual
percentage of Commission parole decisions within and above the guidelines.)
46. See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 262 n.115 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572).
47. The severity levels range from "low," for offenses such as possession of
small quantities of marijuana for personal use, to "greatest II," for offenses such as
kidnapping and homicide. See 28 C.F.R. 2.20 (1978). The guidelines are reproduced
in Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 104-06 (1978).
48. Bistram v. United States Parole Bd., 535 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (Commission permitted to base severity rating on dismissed count of kidnapping notwithstanding bargained plea to bank robbery). See also U.S. Parole Comm'n
Research Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guideline Application Manual 4.08 (U.S. Parole
Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 16, 1977) (adopted by the Commission as Appendix
4, U.S. Parole Comm'n Procedure Manual, on May 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Guideline Application Manual]; Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d
938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (Board entitled to be fully advised of contents of presentence
report, which includes actual offense behavior, and to use it in giving an offense severity rating). Cf. United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1979), on remand
from 99 S. Ct. 67 (1978) (impact of parole guidelines on application of concurrent
sentence doctrine).
49. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The table for determination of a prisoner's salient factor score is reproduced in Hoffman & Stover, supra note 47, at 107.
50. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The salient factors are: prior convictions, prior
incarcerations, age at first commitment, whether present offense involves auto theft
or forgery or larceny, whether parole has been revoked, history of heroin or opiate
dependence, and employment or full-time school attendance for at least six months
during the last two years prior to incarceration. Id.
51. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The number of points possible for each "salient
factor" varies from one to three. Id.
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eleven are combined to form a "very good" rating; scores of six

through eight are "good"; a score of four or five is "'fair";

and scores

of zero to three are "poor." 52 The "very good" rating corresponds
53
to the minimum customary length of imprisonment.
Unless there is good cause for a decision outside the guide-

lines, 54 a prisoner will be granted parole at some date falling
within the customary range of imprisonment. 55 Approximately onequarter of all prisoners, however, have sentences that are too short

to allow them to serve the customary range of imprisonment:
These prisoners are routinely denied parole. 56
An analysis performed by the Parole Board on statistics for prisoners released in
1972 shows that the "percentage favorable outcome" (the probability that a prisoner
will perform satisfactorily upon release from prison) for each salient factor score is as
follows:
Salient Factor
Percent FavorNumber in
Score
able Outcome
Sample
11
100%
24
10
96%
49
9
92%
77
8
88%
101
7
87%
83
6
77%
105
5
72%
149
4
67%
148
3
61%
139
2
61%
90
1
39%
41
0
20%
5
P. Hoffman & J. Beck, Research Note: Salient Factor Score Validation-A 1972 Release Cohort, at H-7 (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 8, 1975).
52. Using the 1972 data set out in note 51 supra, the weighted average of the
"percent favorable outcome" for each of the four ranges of salient factor scores is as
follows:
Weighted Percent
Rating
FavorableOutcome
Very good
95.3%
(9-11)
Good
83.7%
(6-8)
Fair
69.5%
(4-5)
Poor
57.0%
(0-3)
53.
54.
55.
56.

See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978).
18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976).
Guideline Application Manual, supra note 48, at 4.13-.17.
Information provided in discovery in proceedings in Geraghty v. United
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An effort is made to minimize the number of cases finding
good cause to depart from the guidelines. 57 In fiscal year 1977,
only 6.6% of all parole release decisions were below the guidelines,
while 13.5% were above. 58 Thus, it is obvious that the parole
guidelines have effectively achieved uniformity by insuring that the
overwhelming majority of decisions are made in the same way.
What is not obvious is that while the parole guidelines were intended to perpetuate existing policies, they unintentionally created
new policies, bringing equal or greater arbitrariness to individual
parole release decisions.
REIFICATION OF UNDESIRED POLICIES

When descriptive guidelines are created by analyzing preguideline decisionmaking, 5 9 the underlying assumption is that
unstructured decisionmaking has produced a fair result in the average case;60 guidelines are needed to reduce the number of cases in
which the average decision is not made. If, however, these assumptions are erroneous, either because the average decision is arbitrary or because decisions are made on the basis of impermissible
criteria, descriptive guidelines will perpetuate this unfairness.61
This problem is reflected in the parole guidelines and will arise if
States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420
(1979) (No. 78-572) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review), shows that of the
6151 initial hearings held from October 1977 to March 1978, 1635 cases (26.58%) resulted in a denial of parole because the prisoner would serve his or her sentence before he or she would serve the "customary length of imprisonment" of the
guidelines.
57. Parole hearings are conducted by two hearing examiners. 28 C.F.R. § 2.23
(1978). The Parole Commission maintains statistics on the number of cases in which
each hearing examiner has voted to make a decision outside of the guidelines, and
meetings are periodically held with all of the hearing examiners to review these statistics. Record at 18, Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 76-1467 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 22, 1978) (hearing), on remand from 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572) (testimony of James C. Neagles, chief
hearing examiner, U.S. Parole Commission). This procedure is plainly designed to
produce greater uniformity in decisionmaking.
58. B. Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note 11, at R-10.
59. See D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILlINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 137.
60. See Singer, In Favor of "Presumptive Sentences" Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24 CRiME & DELINQUENCY 401, 413-17 (1978).

61. This problem was noted in an early case dealing with the parole
guidelines, but was viewed as unimportant because of the Board's power to depart
from the guidelines. See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 929 & n.3 (D. Conn.
1973). Subsequent experience with application of the guidelines, however, shows
that this power is used only in exceptional cases. See note 129 infra and
accompanying text.
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descriptive guidelines are created to model present sentencing
practices.
The parole guidelines are the product of a study of actual
decisionmaking in Federal Youth Corrections Act 6 2 cases, 63 where

incarceration is generally for no longer than six years of treatment. 64 The determination of when a Youth Corrections Act offender is to be released rests solely with the Parole66 Board; 65 a
judge has no power to control the length of treatment.
The study of Youth Corrections Act decisionmaking tested the
hypothesis that four factors controlled decisionmaking: offense severity, parole prognosis, institutional program participation, and institutional discipline. 67 The study concluded that the most important of these factors was a judgment of the severity of the
prisoner's offense. 68 Of the other factors, only parole prognosis, a

judgment of the likelihood that the offender could successfully
complete a parole term, was found to contribute significantly to
decisionmaking. 69 These two factors were then chosen as the basis
for decisionmaking in future cases, 70 and are loosely related 7 ' to
the offense severity scale and the salient factor scale of the present
parole guidelines. 72
The problem with structuring prospective decisionmaking on
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
63. This study was conducted from November 1, 1971, to May 30, 1972 under
the aegis of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. It was designed to: (1)
test the congruence between actual and desired parole policies, permitting corrective
action if incongruities were found; (2) make explicit previously implicit policies,
thereby reducing criticism directed against the Parole Board for exercising unfettered discretion; and (3) provide "a measure of equity, alerting parole board members to recommendations or decisions which appear to vary substantially from existing policies." P. Hoffman, Paroling Policy Feedback 2-3 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp. Rep. No. 8, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Paroling Policy
Feedback]. Approximately 340 cases were involved in the study. Id. at 8 n.6.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976). The district judge may increase the possible
length of treatment up to the maximum permitted for the offense of conviction upon
a finding that more than six years of treatment may be necessary. Id. § 5010(c).
65. See id. § 5017(a).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. Paroling Policy Feedback, supra note 63, at 9-10.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. at 10.
70. P. Hoffman & D. Gottfredson, Paroling Policy Guidelines: A Matter of Equity 5-9 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp. Rep. No. 9, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Paroling Policy Guidelines].
71. See text accompanying notes 98-103, 112-115 infra.
72. Paroling Policy Guidelines, supra note 70, at 12-15.
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these two factors is that the Board's heavy reliance on offense severity was directly contrary to congressional mandate. In 1972,
when the Youth Corrections Act study was conducted, the primary
factor intended by Congress to determine when an offender should
be released was whether the prisoner had been rehabilitated. 73 Offense severity was to be of minimal importance: The essence of the
Act was that "execution of sentence was to fit the person, not the
crime for which he was convicted." 7 4 Thus, fashioning guidelines
which described the Board's implicit Youth Corrections Act policies, with their heavy reliance upon severity, perpetuated this policy in direct contravention of the congressional mandate. 75
Current sentencing practices similarly provide a poor basis for
prospective decisionmaking. While it cannot be said that the average sentencing decision is unlawful, 76 there is no assurance that
the average sentencing decision is fair. When judges in the same
circuit assert that they would impose sentences ranging from probation to twenty years of imprisonment in an identical case, 77 there
73. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974). The release criteria
in the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a) (1976), were amended as
part of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218
(1976). The purpose of the amendment was "to provide for parallel parole release
criteria for all eligible prisoners." H.R. REP. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 36, reprinted in [1976J U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 583, 601. This amendment has
been read as repealing the rehabilitative purposes of Federal Youth Corrections Act
commitments. See, e.g., De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1978). If
this was the intent of Congress, however, it was not clearly expressed in the legislative history of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. Cf. Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 470 (1975) ("To read a substantial change in accepted practice into a revision of the Criminal Code without any support in the legislative history of that provision is unsupportable").
74. Id. at 434.
75. Application of the guidelines to Youth Corrections Act prisoners sentenced
prior to the 1976 amendments, see note 73 supra, has been held to be unlawful in
several cases. See, e.g., De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Fletcher, 425 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1976); United States ex rel. Mayet v.
Sigler, 403 F. Supp. 1243 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 556 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1977).
In a series of cases, the Second Circuit has criticized the heavy reliance on offense
severity in the guidelines as contrary to the rehabilitative purposes of the Youth Corrections Act. United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Torun,
537 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1976).
76. As long as a sentence is within the statutory limits, it is lawful. See Core v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1958); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741
(1948); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
77. See A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, Second Circuit Sentencing Study, A Report to
the Judges of the Second Circuit, reprinted in Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws:
Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8101 (1974).
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must be serious doubt whether the average of such disparate treatment is fair. The same is true for geographical sentence disparities:
Is the average term of imprisonment for bank robbers of 78.7
months imposed in the Southern District of New York fairer than
the average of 181.2 months imposed in the Western District of
Missouri? 78 Or is this disparity justifiable because bank robbery is

considered a more serious crime in Missouri than in New York?
An additional problem is apparent when sentencing decisions
are analyzed to determine which factors contribute to disparate
treatment. One careful analysis of sentencing statistics 79 concludes
that certain factors, which should have no place in the sentencing
decision, do in fact have an impact on the type and length of sentence imposed. The most objectionable of these factors are the race
and economic status of the defendant. First offenders who are
black receive harsher sentences than do first offenders who are
white.8 0 Defendants who are convicted at bench trials and who are
represented by retained counsel receive more lenient sentences
than similarly convicted defendants represented by appointed
counsel.81 In addition, harsher sentences are imposed upon defendants convicted at jury trials than those convicted at bench
2
trials.8
True descriptive guidelines would not eliminate this problem,
but would only perpetuate it.8 3 One answer is to eliminate undesirable factors, such as race and type of counsel, from the objective measures used in the guidelines.8 4 But this would result in
guidelines which are no longer descriptive and, as in the creation
of the parole guidelines, 85 might result in new policies less fair
than preguideline decisionmaking. 86
78. These statistics are based on prisoners discharged in fiscal years 1974
and 1975. See Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 9201 n.8.
79. Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A StatisticalAnalysis of Sentencing in Federal
Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967-1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975).

80. Id. at 387-88.
81. Id. at 386-87.
82. Id. at 379-80.
83.

Descriptive guidelines "summarize expected ...

decisions ...

on the basis

of recent practice, and indicate the relative weights given to what apparently are the
most important factors considered, [but] they tell neither what the decisions nor the
criteria ought to be." D. Gottfredson, C. Cosgrove, L. Wilkins, J. Wallerstein & C.
Rauh, Classification for Parole Decison Policy 19 (July 1978) (paper prepared under
grant from National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA,
U.S. Dep't of Justice) (emphasis in original).
84. See D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 141.
85. See text accompanying notes 87 & 88 infra.
86. A second flaw in this approach is that reliance upon an impermissible fac-
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UNINTENTIONAL CREATION OF NEW POLICY

Once existing policies have been analyzed, the next step in
creating descriptive guidelines is to fashion objective means for
measuring factors found to control decisionmaking.8 7 A second
problem then arises: It is likely that the attempt to create a mathematical model for existing policies will be unsuccessful and, instead, new, unconsidered policies will be created.
The parole guidelines illustrate two ways in which descriptive
guidelines can fail to accurately represent existing policies. The
first is through failing to completely analyze decisionmaking; the
second is because of methodological flaws in the creation of the objective measures needed for guidelines.
The Parole Board's attempt to apply its implicit Youth Corrections Act policies to cases involving adult prisoners"8 demonstrates
the Board's failure to completely analyze its preguideline decisionmaking. Length of sentence could not have been a factor in Youth
Corrections Act release decisions because there is no sentence.
Youth Corrections Act commitments are generally for an indeterminate period of up to six years, 89 and a youth offender is eligible
for release immediately upon imprisonment.90 Had the Parole
Board studied its implicit policies in cases involving adult prisoners, however, it would have found the length of sentence to be a
factor in deciding whether to grant or deny parole: Most prisoners
are not eligible for parole until they have served one-third of their
sentence. 9 ' This was true before adoption of the guidelines and retor, such as race, may be obscured by using a factor which, while fair on its face,
would have a disparate impact upon black persons. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight standards held to have disparate impact upon
women, although found to be bona fide occupational qualification); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (requirement of high school education held to have
disparate impact upon black persons); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285

(1969) (literacy test held to have disparate impact upon black persons).
87. "A disadvantage of subjective measures is that they may reflect rationalizations for decisions rather than determinants of them." Paroling Policy Feedback, supra note 63, at 11.
88. The only difference between the guideline table created for adult prisoners
and Federal Youth Corrections Act prisoners is the use of different customary
lengths of imprisonment. The Parole Commission has explained this difference as reflecting "the goals" of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. See 41 Fed. Reg. 37,316-17
(1976).

89. See 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976). See also note 64 supra.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a) (1976).
91. For example, of the 11,071 persons sentenced to imprisonment in 1970,
6,688, or 60%, received regular sentences, i.e., sentences where parole eligibility
came at the one-third point of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970). Administra-
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mains so. The guidelines are directed solely to parole release,92 not
to parole eligibility, which, for adults, is generally controlled by
statute.93 The Parole Board apparently failed to appreciate the statutory release criteria when it based its adult guidelines on Youth
Corrections Act policies. As a result, more than one-quarter of all
prisoners receive sentences which are too short to allow them to
serve the customary length of imprisonment dictated by the
guidelines. 94 Another twenty-five percent of prisoners receive sentences of such length that they are not eligible for parole until
after they have served more time than their customary length of
imprisonment: 95 The guidelines "predict" release before these prisoners are eligible under the statute by which they were sentenced!
These results are more than anomalous; that only "approximately
50 percent of the defendants sentenced to imprisonment . . .are

96
eligible for parole at the time recommended in the guidelines"
graphically illustrates that the guidelines do not accurately describe
97
preguideline decisionmaking.
Even if the Youth Corrections Act policies had been the same
as in adult cases, the manner in which the severity of a prospective
parolee's offense and the subjective judgment of his or her parole
prognosis were transformed into the offense severity and salient
factor scales resulted in policies unrelated to those found to have
been controlling Youth Corrections Act release decisions. The
judgment of offense severity in the Youth Corrections Act study

tive Office of the United States Court, Federal Offenders in the United States District Court, 1970, at 2 (1972). The percentage rises to 69% when Federal Youth Correction Act, 18 U.S.C, 5017 (1970), and Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.
5041 (1970), prisoners (totaling 1447) are excluded.
92. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1978).
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a)-(b).
94. See note 56 supra.
95. Only about one-half of all prisoners are eligible for parole at the time recommended in the guidelines. See note 96 infra and accompanying text. If approximately one-quarter of these prisoners fall outside the guidelines because their sentences are too short to allow them to serve their customary length of imprisonment,
see note 56 supra, the remainder of these prisoners must be ineligible because their
sentences are so long that the guidelines blindly indicate release before statutory eligibility is achieved.
96. Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 8995, 9000 (statement of Ronald L.
Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Improvements in the Administration of Criminal justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
97. This is consistent with an independent analysis of the Board's decisionmaking practices prior to adoption of the guidelines. This study concluded that the
two most important factors in decisionmaking were time served and length of sentence. See J. SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 62.
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was analogous to the decision of a judge in imposing sentence. Just
as a judge has the discretion to impose any sentence within statutory limits, 98 the Parole Board members in the Youth Corrections
Act study were free to assign whatever severity rating they deemed
appropriate, regardless of the type of offense involved.99 To make
this subjective judgment, the Parole Board members had access to
all the facts and circumstances of the prospective parolee's offense.' 00 In addition, the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to
speak in mitigation.' 0 '
The offense severity scale created for the parole guidelines
bears no relation to this subjective judgment of the severity of an
individual prisoner's offense. Possibly because of a desire to rationalize the parole decision,10 2 the offense severity ratings created for
the parole guidelines are based on the name of the offense involved, 10 3 rather than on the nature and circumstances of the offense.
As originally fashioned, the severity scale classified offenses
into six levels of severity.' 0 4 These classifications were determined
by distributing sets of index cards, each card containing the name
of an offense,' 0 5 to members of the Parole Board, who were asked
to sort the cards into six piles of varying severity levels.' 06 The resulting severity scale was constructed from the average severity ratings which had been assigned to the various offenses.' 0 7 It is obvious
98. See text accompanying note 76-78 supra.
99. Offense severity was rated at the conclusion of each Federal Youth Corrections Act hearing by circling one of six descriptions of offense severity. Paroling Policy Feedback, supra note 63, at 28 app. The only direction for affixing the severity
rating was that it should correspond "to [the examiner's) evaluation of the severity of
the offense behavior for which this subject was committed." Id.
100. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1973).
101. Id. § 2.15.
102. See note 87 supra.
103. The process by which the offense severity ratings were created is described in P. Hoffman & J. Beck, Practical Application of a Severity Scale (NCCD
Parole Decison-Making Project, Supp. Rep. No. 13, 1973). See also Geraghty v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572).
104. The levels were labeled "low severity," "low/moderate severity," "moderate severity," "high severity," "very high severity," and "greatest severity." P.
Hoffman & J. Beck, supra note 103, at 26-27. The "greatest severity" level was divided into "Greatest I" and "Greatest II" levels in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (1977).
105. The cards contained "short statements explaining the offense behavior
(e.g., armed robbery, embezzlement less than $20,000, possession of 'heavy narcotics'
by addict less than $500)." Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Id.
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that this system ignores facts which could justify granting probation
to one offender and imposing a twenty year sentence upon another, each of whom had been convicted of the same offense, or of
involvement in the same conspiracy.' 08
This system of offense severity rating implements a "just deserts" policy: Persons who commit the same offense are treated in
the same way, regardless of individual differences which would justify disparate treatment. While this policy has been advanced by
some sentencing reformers, 10 9 it was not deduced from the study
of Youth Corrections Act decisionmaking, nor was it expicitly
adopted by the Parole Board."10 Instead, this policy was the inevitable result of the decision by the Board's researchers to replace a
subjective rating of the severity of an individual's offense with predetermined severity ratings which ignore the actual sentence
imposed and any facts which could enhance or mitigate the severity of a given offense."'
The measure of parole prognosis created for the guidelines is
also quite different from the estimation of parole prognosis which
was used in the Youth Corrections Act study. There, the judgment
of parole prognosis was an ad hoc decision based on the facts
and circumstances of each case: What is the likelihood that this
prisoner, released at this time, will be able to successfully complete a parole term?"12 A decision to deny release because of a
108. See id. at 4.
109. See, e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING, supra note 20; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 20, at 98-106.

CRIMINAL

110. The Parole Board's explanation for the "just desert" model is that it is the
result of the need to correct sentence disparity. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,350 (1975). This,
however, appears to be an after-the-fact rationalization because sentence disparity
was not considered in the Youth Corrections Act study. See Paroling Policy Feedback, supra note 63, at 10.
111. This system of rating severity ignores the teachings of attribution theory
that the perceived severity of crimes is influenced by "attribution judgments": To
what extent was this person responsible for this act, and to what extent does this act
reflect a dispositon to engage in crime? See, e.g., Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc.
REV. 224 (1974). For example, a public official who accepts a bribe may be viewed
as having committed a less serious offense if the bribe is an isolated incident, motivated by a need to pay costly medical bills for a sick child, than if the bribe is simply
one of many, all of which were motivated solely by personal greed. Under the offense severity system created for the parole guidelines, however, the severity rating
for each bribery offense would be identical.
112. The question asked in the Federal Youth Corrections Act study was: Rate
on a scale ranging from zero to 100, in increments of 10, the estimate of likely parole
,outcome. Paroling Policy Feedback, supra note 63, at 29 app.
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poor parole prognosis could have been based on the belief that additional incarceration was needed before the committed youth offender would be rehabilitated.11 3 If rehabilitation for a particular
prisoner was considered impossible, denying release because of a
epoor parole prognosis would continue to incapacitate a person who,
4
when released, would again violate the law."1

In contrast with this subjective judgment of whether, after a
given amount of imprisonment, a particular prisoner has been rehabilitated, the objective measure of parole prognosis created for
the parole guidelines, the salient factor scale, is unrelated to the
likelihood of rehabilitation.11 5 Its dictate is constant, regardless of
whether a prisoner has been confined for one day or twenty years.
The salient factor scale was derived from an analysis of the impact of sixty-six factors on the postrelease behavior of federal prisoners who had been discharged from custody during the first six
months of 1970.116 Omitted from these factors was the recommen7
dation for or against parole made by the prisoner's case worker."1
Included was background data, virtually all of which was known at
the time of sentencing, such as information about the present offense, prior criminal record, age, education, employment record,
past and projected living arrangements,"18 and prison conduct. 119
113. This, of course, would have been consistent with the "treatment" rationale
of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3, reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3983, 3985.
114. Denying release because rehabilitation was adjudged to be impossible
would have been in accord with the early goal of parole to provide "an opportunity
to relieve the prisoner whose reform has been effected and who gives promise of future good conduct." Parole of United States Prisoners,Hearings on S. 870 and H.R.
23016 Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,61st Cong., 2d Sess.,
27 (1910) (testimony of Judge W.H. DeLacy).
115. According to the Parole Commission: "[Slocial science suggests [that
rehabilitative factors] can neither be detected nor measured." 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328,
41,329.(1975).
116. D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 41.
117. A study of parole decisionmaking in Illinois concludes that the recommendations of a correctional sociologist are a powerful predictor of the parole decision.
Heinz, Heinz, Senderowitz & Vance, Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67
J. CRUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (1976).
118. Reliance upon projected living arrangements as a factor predictive of successful parole was abandoned in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,043, 12,043 (1977). As the acting chairman of the Parole Commission subsequently indicated, reliance upon this
factor gave rise to a number of "meretricious relationships." Letter from Dorothy
Parker to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (June 20, 1977), reprinted in Senate Hearings,
supra note 17, at 9028, 9031.
119. P. Hoffman & J. Beck, Parole Decison-Making: A Salient Factor Score, at
B-3 (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 2, 1974).
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Nine of these items were selected to form the salient factor
scale, 120 which has a range of possible scores from zero to eleven,
based on the presence or absence of the nine factors from the
background of a particular prisoner. 12 1 This scale was subsequently divided into four levels of salient factor scores,'12 2 as in the
present guidelines.
A "very good" salient factor score, any score between nine and
eleven, corresponds to the minimum customary length of imprisonment for a given offense severity rating.123 Lower scores mandate a
longer customary length of imprisonment. The result is to increase
the customary length of imprisonment as the actuarial probability
of recidivism increases. 124 Making the length of imprisonment dependent upon the likelihood that the prisoner may commit crimes
in the future is possibly unlawful, 12 5 and probably unjust. 126 This
policy, like the policy of just deserts implemented in the offense
severity scale, was not deduced from the study of Youth Corrections Act decisionmaking and was not explicitly adopted by the
Parole Board. It was instead the inevitable result of the desire of
the Board's researchers to replace a subjective estimation of parole
prognosis with an actuarial calculation of postrelease behavior
which was unrelated to the type of release or to the length of time
spent in custody.
The power of the Parole Board to grant parole irrespective of
the guidelines 12 7 has not cured the potential unfairness of individual decisions. Decisions outside the guidelines are made infre120. Id. In 1977 the Board reduced the number of salient factors from nine to
seven. 42 Fed. Reg. 12045 (1977). See note 50 supra.
121. In the original salient factor scale, a maximum of one point was awarded
for seven of the salient factors; two points could be earned for each of two factors, resulting in a maximum total score of eleven. See 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,337 (1975).
In the present guidelines, one point is awarded for four factors, two points for two
factors and three points for one factor. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978).
122. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
123. The table for determination of a prisoner's salient factor score is reproduced in Hoffman & Stover, supra note 47, at 107. For the guidelines, see id. at
104-06.
124. See note 51 supra; text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
125. It has been suggested that because the salient factor scale is unrelated to
the length of confinement, the guidelines are contrary to the "release [would] not
jeopardize the public welfare" standard of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976). P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 29 n.20.
126. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73 (1974).

127. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) allows the Parole Commission "to grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines ... if it determines that there is good
cause for so doing." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976).
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quently: 28s The Parole Board's analysis of12such
decisions shows that
9
they are made only in extreme situations.

It would be difficult to convince those prisoners, twenty-six
percent of the entire prison population, who are denied parole be-

cause their sentences are too short to allow them to serve the
customary length of imprisonment, 130 that the guidelines have

brought greater rationality to parole release decisionmaking. It
would be equally hard to explain to a prisoner with a salient factor

score of five that he or she must serve more prison time before being paroled than a prisoner with a salient factor score of six because
twenty-eight percent of all prisoners with a salient factor score of

five will be unable to complete a parole term, compared with
twenty-three percent of all prisoners with a salient factor score of

six. 131 All that can be said to these prisoners is that regardless of
how arbitrary the denial of parole may be in their case, the

guidelines have succeeded in bringing overall uniformity to parole
decisionmaing. More must be required of guidelines: In addition
to promoting uniformity in decisionmaking, guidelines must insure
that individual decisions are made in a fair and rational manner.
CONCLUSION

Experience with the parole guidelines shows that descriptive
guidelines can effectively insure that the overwhelming majority of
sentencing decisions are made uniformly. However, increased uniformity may not increase the fairness of individual decisions.
Uniformity in decisionmaking can be easily achieved. For ex-

128. See note 11 supra.
129. One analysis of decisions outside of the guidelines shows that in only 34
out of 1080 cases was a decision made above or below the guidelines because of institutional progress, and that factors relating to the offense committed by the prospective parolee resulted in a departure from the guidelines in only 9 of those 1080
cases. P. Hoffman & L. DeGostin, Parole Decision-Making: Structuring Discretion,
at E-10 to 11 (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 5, 1974).
130. See note 56 supra.
131. Seventy-seven percent of prisoners with a salient factor score of six will
successfully complete a two-year parole term. See note 51, supra. Seventy-two percent of persons with a salient factor score of five will successfully complete that
same parole term. Id. This means that for prisoners with a salient factor score of six,
23 of every hundred will be unable to complete a parole term, while 28 of every
hundred with a salient factor score of five will be unable to complete a parole term.
Thus, because five more persons, of every hundred, will be unable to complete a
parole term, all prisoners with a salient factor score of five are required to serve a
longer customary length of imprisonment.
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ample, it could be determined that parole will be granted to prisoners whose surnames begin with the letters A through K, and
denied to all others. Such a guideline system would insure that all
discretionary decisions are made in the -same way, but would be
plainly arbitrary--even if a decision to depart from the guidelines
could be based on a finding of good cause.
The difference between the federal parole guidelines and this
crude alphabetical guideline system is only one of degree. While
not based on an obviously arbitrary division of prisoners, the parole
guidelines are based on an equally arbitrary classification of offenses and offender characteristics, which effectively makes the
parole decision dependent upon whether a lenient or harsh sentence has been imposed.
It is only recently that there has been serious judicial or scholarly analysis of the policies actually implemented in the parole
guidelines.1 32 Although it is difficult to understand how a prisoner
with a two-year sentence could be expected to serve a "customary
length of imprisonment" of twenty-six to thirty-six months, judges
and commentators have apparently been reluctant to question the
claim that complex statistical methods have produced true descriptive guidelines. This reluctance to question the policies actually implemented by guidelines underscores the need for caution in the
creation of guidelines. Such caution, however, is lacking in the
sentencing guideline system contemplated by the Senate bill,
which, in addition to delegating to a Sentencing Commission the
task of creating guidelines, would entrust that body with the duty
of creating a nationwide sentencing policy.13 3 Given the complexity

of the guidelines required by the Senate bill, the temptation would
be great for the Sentencing Commission to follow the lead of the
Parole Board and create guidelines first, and rationalize policy
later. 134 As the history of the parole guidelines indicates, the creation of descriptive guidelines runs a major risk that the social scientists developing the guidelines will make important policy decisions while ostensibly creating objective measures.
Experience with the federal parole guidelines indicates that
the goal of individual justice may not be achievable by descriptive
132. See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (No. 78-572); J. SCHIIDT, supra note 44.
133. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1159.

134.

See note 110 supra.
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guidelines. Certainly, before such guidelines are adopted, other
approaches should be investigated for an answer to the "national
scandal" of unwarranted sentence disparity. If, notwithstanding,
descriptive guidelines are ultimately adopted, extraordinary care
must be taken in their creation. Too much is at stake in sentencing
to adopt a system which brings equality for all but justice for none.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/2

22

